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PATHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Innocent Convicted in Three Murder Cases
Max Hirschberg'
criminal, the fallibility of testimony,
the unreliability of evidence by expert
Introduction to the Problem
witnesses, but the main problem, the
A comparison between American
psychology of criminal justice itself, is
Criminology and European Criminology neglected. We are in the strange posiis extremely interesting. If we look at
tion of possessing a psychology of the
outstanding works of modern American
criminal and the witness, but not of the
criminology such as those by Hugo
judge and the jury. We find the most
Muensterberg (1), John Henry Wigstriking, evidence of this fact in the
more (2), Robert H. Gault (3),
work "Psychologie und PsychopatholoNathaniel F. Cantor (4), Roscoe Pound gie der Aussage" by Otto Moenke(5), Sol Sheldon Glueck (6), Harold moeller (13); only two of the four
Ernest Burtt (7), Henry Weihofen (8),
hundred twenty-five pages of this work
Edwin H. Sutherland (9), Francis C. are devoted to the psychology of the
Ainsworth Mitchell (10), Joseph N.
judge, while all the rest deals with the
Ulman (11) on the one side and at outcriminal and the witness. A glance at
standing works of modern European his bibliography gives further evidence
criminology as those by Hans Gross for our statement. And so we have a
(12), Otto Moenkemoeller (13), Erich criminology which is neglecting
its
Wulffen (14), Gustav Aschaffenburg main problem, that is to say,
the psy(15), Hans v. Hentig (16), Albert chology of just that person who has to
Hellwig (17) (Germany); Cesare Lommake the decision and has to assume
broso (18), Enrico Ferri (19), Enrico the responsibility for the life or
death
Altavilla (20), Francesco Pagano (21)
of the defendant. This responsibility is
(Italy); Zangger (22) (Switzerland); very heavy: the life or death of
the
Emile Fourquet (23) Maurice Lailler defendant is at stake, not only
when a
and Henri Vonoven (24) (France), on death sentence is involved; a man of
the other side, we find a striking simblameless conduct, who is convicted of
ilarity of problems and methods. The
fraud or forgery, is just as well dead.
criminal and the witness are the central Thus arises the very serious problem
problem everywhere, not the judge
of wrongful conviction. A comparison
and the jury. Everywhere there has between American and European
crimbeen collected enormous, valuable mainology shows the second striking simterial about the psychology of the
ilarity, that this problem is neglected
160 E. 42nd St., New York City, (Dr. Jur).
in both of them. There are very few
I
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books which deal with the problem of
the conviction of the innocent. Only
France--of course not the corpse of
France of today, but the immortal
France of Human Rights, which will
arise again, and Italy-of course not the
caricature of Italy under the dictatorship of Mussolini, but the immortal
Italy of Mazzini, which will arise again
-have
investigated arduously the
errors in criminal justice (25); it is the
glory of France that she fought for
"twelve years, from 1894 to 1906, to
restore justice in the case of Captain
Dreyfus. The few works written by
Edwin M. Borchard (26), Erich Sello
(27), _Lailler and Vonoven (24) are
exceptions. But the scientific analysis
of wrongful convictions is more important than the analysis of the criminal
or the witness. A system of medicine
without general and special pathology
surely would be an absurdity, but just
as absurd is the position of modern
criminology without a psychology of
the judge and the juror and without a
careful analysis of wrongful convictions.
We need a radical, a really Copernical
turning around of the general position
in criminology; we need a pathology of
criminal justice.
The writer recognized this problem
many years ago while acting as a
German lawyer. He received a letter
from a man convicted for murder. The
man insisted he was innocent. A careful investigation resulted in the discovery that the convicted man was not
guilty of murder. I entered upon a long
and difficult struggle and finally was'
successful; the man got a new trial and
was acquitted. This story circulated

through the prison cells of Germany
and I got many hundreds of letters from
convicted persons, asking for help. Of
course, many of them were not innocent; but I had to investigate every case
carefully. Thus I had to deal for many
years with the great problem of conviction of the innocent, practically and
s4entifically. Under German law the
defendant is entitled to a new trial if
there is evidence of new facts Which
create reasonable doubt about the first
sentence. The enormous material, thus
collected, laid the basis for a scientific
analysis about the sources of wrongful
convictions. The result of these many
years. of defense-work and scientific
research is a manuscript completed in
the United States one year ago:
"Wrongful Convictions. A Pathology
of Criminal Justice." Only a few results
can be submitted in this article to the
judgment of American lawyers and
scientists.
The method of a pathology of criminal justice has to resemble the methods
of medical pathology. The material of
the research consists of cases of wrongful convictions, in which the innocence
of the defendant had been recognized
later by the Courts. The author has
collected from his material for this
Journal three murder cases, in which
the scientific findings can be explained
excellently. We may see exactly where
and why justice faltered, with what
obstinacy the Court tried to insist on
the errors once committed; (29) we look
at the long and difficult fight against the
reluctant Courts and finally we see the
recognition of the mistake and the
acquittal of the innocent man. This
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analysis of three cases may be more
instructive than merely theoretical
statements.
This outline cannot give all details
of the research; but a short summing
up of some of the main results may
facilitate the understanding of the following statements. The author has
learned by his own experience that the
scientific results of modern criminology
have not penetrated deep enough into
criminal justice. We have collected an
enormous material about the fallibility
of testimony; but criminal justice often
acts as if there were no perjury, no
error in identification, no hysteria of
female witnesses, no fantastic stories
of children trembling on the witnessstand. Exactly the same observation
may be quoted for American justice
from Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice
in America (1930, p. 35): "A complete
change in the spirit and attitude of the
science of law has been foregoing in
the twentieth century. But as yet it
has made little impression upon the
profession." We know much today of
the fallibility of expert witnesses, but
the blind confidence of criminal justice
in the expert witness and his alleged
authority has not been shattered. We
find, especially in American criminology, excellent methods to substitute or
control the unreliable evidence by testimony with methods of precision; but
criminal justice is still dealing with the
dangerous identification by witnesses,
without using the methods of precision
prepared by modern science.
A second main reason for wrongful
conviction is- the superficial judgment,
which contents itself with probability

or half-evidence and overlooks the
doubt still remaining. The Court contents itself with a feeling of certainty;
but only exact evidence excluding every
possible doubt justifies a sentence which
may destroy the life and happiness of
a man and his family for ever. Criminal
justice often soothes the remaining
doubts light-heartedly with the common-place idea, that it is human to
commit errors and that only "reasonable doubt" must be eliminated. Even
Nathaniel F. Cantor (4 p. 243) states:
"In scientific research, evidence is
rejected unless accompanied by data
which support one hypothesis and do
not support alternative hypotheses.
Judicial proof rests on probability
rather than certainty." Here we have
the main problem: criminal justice
which is satisfied with probability instead of certainty is exposed to endless
wrongful convictions. The task of the
defense of tomorrow will be to analyze
every inference with the weapon of
exactness as long as some doubts remain, Every doubt is "reasonable"
when life or death of our fellow-beings
are at stake.
Any progress from the feeling of
evidence, the "conviction intime" to
exact scientific evidence is impossible
in Europe today, for politicpl and
spiritual reasons; but it can be achieved
in the United States, where the attempt
is prevailing to give a fair trial and a
just sentence to every defendant.
Science has prepared the means of progress, because the principles of exact
scientific proof, worked out by Wigmore
(2), Gault (3), Cantor (4), Pound (5)
and others are the most valuable con-
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tribution of American criminology to
the fight against error in criminal justice; there is nothing in French, Italian,
Swiss or German criminology which
might prove as important for the exactness of evidence as these American conceptions. On the other side, many findings of European criminology could
highly enrich American criminology
and American justice; many cases of
wrongful identification, for instance,
may be avoided with the scientific material collected in Europe. Besides, the
English-American system of cross-examination is superior to the European
procedure, where the judge directs the
hearing.
Of course, wrongful convictions are
not altogether unavoidable; it is only
indolence in thought and sentiment to
resign before the "unavoidability" of
error in justice. Today we are able to
restrain to a considerable amount these
errors and their terrible consequences,
in making use of the methods of precision provided by modern criminology.
The following statements may show not
only why and where a mistake occurred,
but also that it could have been avoided,
had criminal justice taken in consideration the results of science and had the
defense fought against the error with
methods of exactness instead of popular
phrases.
The author acted as counsel in the
three following cases only in the new
trial, not in the original trial, where the
wrongful convictions took place. The
three cases are published here for the
first time in America; except two short
statements of the author about the Rettenbeck-case and the Pfeuffer-case the

material has not been published in Germany either.
II

The Rettenbeck-Case
The farmer Lorenz Rettenbeck was
sentenced to death by the Jury of
Straubing (Bavaria) on June 24, 1919.
The death sentence was commuted to
life prison. On July 6, 1934 he was
acquitted by the Court of Landshut
(Bavaria). He had served fifteen -years
of prison for a crime he had never committed. The murderer had been another
man.
Rettenbeck lived in unhappy marriage
with his wife. He threatened and maltreated her several times. During the
new trial the witnesses stated unanimously that the wife was to be held
responsible for that fact; she constantly
was calumniating the neighbors, and
her husband had to pay fines and fees
to the lawyers; it could be understood
that his anger was ar6used against his
wife. But evern more the mother of his
wife who lived with them, was regarded
as a "devil." The wife was ill, so she
hired a servant. Unfortunately the latter was a woman of very immoral con'duct. She entertained sex relations with
many men, among them Rettenbeck
himself. While she was living with
Rettenbeck and his wife, these relations continued. She had her twelve
year old daughter living with her.
On Sunday, December 1, 1918 Rettenbeck finished a basket, ordered by a
neighbor and asked his wife to deliver
it to the customer, who lived in a nearby village, some twenty minutes distant. She left at 4 p.m. delivered the
basket and talked with a friend in the
other village. Then she left for home
at 5 1 p.m. Exactly at 5 1 p.m. she
was murdered in a wood half-way between the two villages. The time could
be determined exactly because several
witnesses heard the shooting. The postmortem examination discovered a
wound in the temple resulting from a
revolver shot fired at short distance.
The suspicion arose at once that nobody
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else but Rettenbeck could be the murderer. He had told a witness that he
would like to get rid of his wife and
that he would gladly pay for her burial.
The servant Anna Noebauer and her
daughter declared that no stranger had
entered the house on December 1, 1919.
This was untrue. A witness, calling on
Rettenbeck at noon of this day, had seen
a soldier sitting in the sitting-room.
When the magistrate told Anna Noebauer and her daughter that an unknown soldier had been seen, they confessed finally that the soldier was a
relative of Anna Noebauer, named
Georg Schickaneder and that he had
called on her on this very day. Stricken
by fatal blindness which characterizes
so many trials, the Court dismissed
Anna Noebauer and Georg Schickaneder
at once as not being involved in the
crime and continued the prosecution
exclusively against Lorenz Rettenbeck,
who seemingly was the only one, interested in the death of his wife. Not
even a search warrant was issued
against the servant -and her cousin.
Rettenbeck was arrested. The magistrate failed to investigate why Georg
Schickaneder had called on Anna Noebauer this very day, where he came
from, when he arrived, how long he
had remained and when he had left
The police, the magistrate and the whole
village was so convinced that only the
husband could have killed his wife,
that no investigation of other persons,
but only the conviction of Rettenbeck
seemed to be necessary.
The most important statement was
given by three witnesses; two ten year
old boys were skating on a sheet of
ice near the Rettenbeck house; a woman looked out of the window of a
near-by house. They saw at a distance
of three hundred and ten yards that
a man was leaving the Rettenbeck
house at 4 3/4 p.m. The two boys declared that it had been too dark to
identify the man with certainty; but
knowing that Rettenbeck was the only
man living in that house, they concluded that Rettenbeck was the man
who came out of that house. Questioned whether the man wore a grey

uniform they answered that the man
had worn a plain suit, not a uniform.
The female witness stated that the man
leaving the house, did not look like
Rettenbeck, as his way of walking was
different.
The trial before the Jury began on
April 1919. It was postponed because
more witnesses seemed to be necessary.
The counsel applied to set free the defendant; the district attorney had no
objections. Thus the unprecedented
fact occurred that a man, indicted for
murder, was released without bail; bail
is unknown in European procedure.
There is no other explanation for this
strange decision save that the Court
itself doubted his being guilty. The trial
went on on June 24, 1919. Rettenbeck
had awaited the trial in his home; he
had not thought to escape. But Anna
Noebauer failed to appear; she had sent
a doctor's certificate of alleged illness.
Georg Schickaneder was present; he
testified under oath and denied any complicity. The counsel did not insist on
the witness Anna Noebauer and did not
object that the highly suspicious Schickaneder testified under oath. Anna Noebauer had stated before that Rettenbeck
had not left his home during the whole
critical afternoon. The counsel evidently gambled with the life of his
client, a carelessness without examnple
in criminal justice. The jury gave a
verdict of first degree murder. Rettenbeck was sentenced to death.
Rettenbeck appealed the sentence. He
entrusted the defense to a new counsel.
This lawyer gambled again carelessly
with the life of his client. He withdrew
the appeal, although the Supreme Court
certainly would have annulled the sen.tence on account of the illegal procedure. Then the counsel applied for
a new investigation. The Court admitted the new investigation, which shows
that the Court itself seriously doubted
the defendant's guilt. The files of the
new investigation covered not less than
five hundred pages. So many new facts
had been discovered after the death
sentence had been spoken. The Court
decided to admit a new trial. The district attorney appealed this decision to
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the Supreme Court, which made a fatal
decision: it rejected the motion for a
new trial; this fatal decision was only
based on the fact that the statements
of Anna Noebauer were unreliable. The
evidence of five hundred and twelve
pages was not even mentioned.
Rettenbeck's death sentence was commuted to a life term. He repeatedly applied for a new trial, but without any
success. After nine years of prison he
wrote me: "I am innocent, convicted to
lifelong imprisonment, please save me."
The investigation of the files brought
me to the conviction that Rettenbeck
had been convicted without any evidence at all; but during the investigation I became firmly convinced that
nobody but Georg Schickaneder had
murdered the woman and that he had
been minstigated to the crime by Anna
Noebauer. Of course, this intuition had
to be proved before denouncing two
other persons. I cannot possibly state
here all details of this legal fight of six.
years.
I repeatedly applied for a new trial;
after a long hearing the Court rejected
this motion. I appealed to the Supreme
Court. The appeal was rejected. But
here the fight entered a new stage; the
Supreme Court admitted the possibility
that Rettenbeck was not the murderer;"
but even then it seemed certain that he
had instigated the crime; also an instigator of first degree murder is liable
to death sentence and so the sentence
was approved by the Supreme Court.
In this desperate situation I came to
a desperate decision: I myself denounced Georg Schickaneder for murder to the district attorney. After hard
resistance this procedure began. There
was evidence that he had left the Rettenbeck house at exactly 5 o'clock and
that he went to the spot, where the
woman was killed at 5:20 p.m. Furthermore it was proved that he had hidden
himself after the event for several weeks
and that his family had given false addresses to the police. Among many
other proofs the following were important: a woman testified that she lived
with a hedge-lawyer in Munich; one
night, shortly after the murder, Anna

Noebauer called on this man and had
a long nightly conference with him.
The witness heard him say: "This letter is heavy evidence against you, that
is a difficult job." The next morning he
told the witness that Anna Noebauer
had confessed that Georg Schickaneder
was the murderer. The new evidence
was so overwhelming that finally, in
June 1934, Rettenbeck was acquitted
and released from prison. I may quote
the following facts from that last sentence: The daughter of Anna Noebauer
who meanwhile had grown up and had
married, told several witnesses that
Rettenbeck was innocently convicted.
She declared that he had been at home
when the fatal shot was heard. She
told one witness, who admonished her
to confess the truth, that her mother
had advised her to testify that she didn't
remember anything. Being called as
witness in the new investigation, she
showed one of the witnesses a postcard,
just received this day from her mother
Anna Noebauer. There was written:
Rettenbeck has applied for a new trial.
You know what you have to state. She
told another witness that the murderer
was a soldier. Later on she stated that
her mother. had told her in the first
trial to testify that nobody else was
present in Rettenbeck's house on December 1, 1918 and that her mother had
sent her to call Schickaneder to the
house. The two witnesses who saw the
man leaving the house, testified that
it had been too dark to ascertain
whether the man leaving the house wore
a uniform or not. They could not identify the man; they only believed that
it had been Rettenbeck, because they
knew of no stranger present there on that
particular day. One witness testified
that two days after the murder, on December 3, 1918, when Rettenbeck had
already been arrested, a man knocked
at her window in the evening and begged
for a piece of bread. The man wore a
soldier's cap. He said: "I have killed
her, the arrested man is innocent, he
must be released." One sister of Anna
Noebauer had a love-affair with a
worker and Anna Noebauer tried to
estrange those two. The sister told one
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witness: "If-Anna gives me any trouble,
I will bring her into prison and Georg
Schickaneder as well; my sister is guilty,
she tried once before to drown Mrs.
Rettenbeck in a watertrough."
The decision concludes that there was
no basis for suspicion and no evidence
at all for the fact that Rettenbeck had
slain his wife. The basis of the first
sentence was completely shaken and
destroyed. Rettenbeck got an indemnity from the State to buy a new farm.
III
Analysis of the Rettenbeck-Case
It is only fair to emphasize that we
are looking at an extreme example of
blindness, unscrupulousness and blundering of criminal justice. But for a
manual of pathology the most extreme
cases are especially instructive. The
master of criminology Hans Gross (12)
emphatically warns the magistrate and
the judge not to follow only one of the
possibilities in the investigation, and to
avoid the fatal blindness which sees only
one trace and overlooks all the others.
It is clear that in the Rettenbeck-case
suspicion at once arose against the husband. But even ff he had been guilty,
the complicity of Anna Noebauer was
completely clear; to dismiss her a few
days after the opening of investigation,
was absurd. No less absurd was the
failure to prosecute Georg Schickaneder, who undoubtedly was the real
murderer. Anna Noebauer had sent for
him the day before the murder occurred.
He arrived in the evening when Rettenbeck and his wife were already asleep
and had a long secret talk with Anna
Noebauer. He left at 43 p. m., allegedly
for 'the station; but no train was leaving
at that time. The afternoon train had
already passed and the evening train
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started at 8 p. m. To get to the station
he had to pass the forest on the same
way on which Mrs. Rettenbeck was returning. He must have met her a few
minutes before 5% p. m. exactly at the
spot, where the corpse was found later.
The moment he and the victim met,
could be fixed exactly, even mathematically. At 5Y p. m. several witnesses
heard the shooting. Schickaneder was
hiding himself, his family gave a false
address to the police. He was a soldier,
accustomed to kill without hesitation.
Anna Noebauer confessed to two witnesses two weeks later that Rettenbeck
was innocent, but the murderer was a
soldier. Before the magistrate Anna
Noebauer and her daughter testified
that nobody else had called on Rettenbeck this very day. It really cannot be
understood that no persecution at all,
no search-warrant, no arrest was ordered against Schickaneder. Today we
know for certain that he killed the
victim and that Anna Noebauer instigated him, because she hoped that Rettenbeck would marry her later and that
she would thus become mistress of the
farm. Of course, she was not free; but
her husband was a prisoner of war.
Later it was proved that she maintained
sex relations with another man and that
she asked him to marry her; when he
objected that she was not free, she
answered: "My husband will not return any more." It is incredible that the
real murderer was permitted to testify
under oath against the innocent defendant. He stuck to his lies without
liesitation and he had not the slightest
remorse in seeing an innocent man serve
fifteen years'in prison for a crime he,
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Schickaneder, had committed; only the
twelve year old girl, when she was
grown up, felt she could not bear the
responsibility any longer and so she confessed the terrible fact before several
witnesses.

tance of possible identification exactly
if the time of observation is exactly
known. The man left at 43/ p.m. on December 1, 1918. At this moment the
three witnesses saw him at a distance
of 310 yards. I asked Professor Kuehl
The case is instructive because it of the Technical University of Munich
shows a man convicted without any evi- for an expertise. The expertise read as
dence at all. We recognize the danger- follows: The sun sets on December 1
ous mistake of accepting a possible for this village at twenty minutes after
motive as evidence. It naturally was 4 p.m. Forty-five minutes past 4 p.m.
possible that Rettenbeck would wish to it was 4 degrees, seven minutes past 5
get rid of his wife, this was a reasonable it was 6Y2 degrees under the horizon.
motive. But the motive can never re- Forty-five minutes past 4 p.m. the visiplace the real evidence. Three witnesses bility was reduced to 4 of the normal
had seen the man when he left the visibility, at seven past 5 p. m.
house. It is very instructive to see how to 1/10. At the time after sunset
the witnesses testified: the woman- a few minutes change the visibility
witness said the man was not like Ret- already considerably. When the visitenbeck; the two boys said they could bility is reduced to A of the n6rmal
not identify the man clearly, but they visibility, one may recognize the face of
believed him to be Rettenbeck because a person at a distance of 31,6 yards, the
they did not know anything about the figure of a person at a distance of 57,7
soldier who had called at Rettenbeck's yards; when the visibility is reduced to
house. They even told the magistrate:
1/10 one may recognize a face at a dis"We believed that he was Rettenbeck tance of 13,4 yards, a figure at a disbecause no other man was in Retten- tance of 22,9 yards. If the sky is covered
beck's house, so only Rettenbeck could or the body is seen against a black backleave the house." Questioned whether ground, these figures are to be reduced.
the man who left at 5 p. m. wore a uni- Therefore it is impossible that the boys
at the time given could surely identify
form, they denied that fact.
Here the defense in the new trial pro- the face of a walking man at a distance
ceeded to a new proof which is of great- of more than from 13 to 32,7 yards and
est importance in cases of doubtful his figure at a distance of more than
identification. The Vincent's Rule (27 from 21,8 to 54,5 yards. His suit could
p. 243) tells us that a witness may not be exactly recognized at a distance
identify during daylight a man who is of more than from 65,4 to 109 yards; a
clearly visible at a distance of not more grey military cloak could just as well
than from 109 to 163 yards. But we are seem to be black. A sure judgment
able to supply a highly important new about the cap was just as well impossimethod of precision here. An expert of ble at a distance of more than from 21,8
astronomy and optics can fix the dis- to 54,5 yards. Consequently the two
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boys could not identify by any means
neither the man nor his cap nor his suit.
The country lawyer who was defending in the first trial had no idea of this
modern kind of evidence. Thus he was
unable to tell the jury that the alleged
evidence was an impossibility. The
man who left the house might have
been Georg Schickaneder as well and
he surely was the man. Later this fact
was proved beyond doubt and he could
not deny it himself. It goes without
saying that many cases of wrongful
identification can be avoided with
similar methods of precision. It was
funny that one of the judges concerned
opposed this expertise in saying: How
can the expert determine that after so
many years? Of course, an expert of
astronomy and optics can just as well
determine exactly the visibility in the
battle of Salamis when day and hour
are known. The fight for justice-the
details cannot be explained in this
short outline-was fought during six
years. We see how reluctantly the
Court admitted the fact, that a terrible error had occurred (29). But the
power of truth is invincible. You may
bury the convicted innocent; his body
will rise again as long as there are men
to fight for justice.
III
The Goetz-Case
The twenty-one year old worker Otto
Goetz was convicted on December 5,
1919 by the Court of Augsburg (Bavaria) for first degree murder. The
death sentence was commuted to lifelong prison on April 27, 1920, that is to
say, after nearly five months of terrible
waiting. After long investigations he
got a new trial in February 1929. I

was charged with the defense in the new
trial. The Court acquitted the defendant from the indictment of wilful murder. He got a three year term for abortion and homicide caused by negligence.
As he had already served nine years
of prison for first degree murder, he
was set free at once and received an
indemnity from the State.
Goetz had made the acquaintance of
the housemaid Maria F. who exercised
a very good influence upon him. He
loved her very much and decided to
marry her. Both had already published
the bans for matrimony. At that time
the bride told her friend that she was
pregnant from him. She insisted on an
abortion though he disapproved of this
intention. She got in touch with a
woman in Munich who undertook criminal abortion professionally; a letter
from this woman was found in the
pocket of the girl after her death. She
insisted that Goetz should prQvide the
means for abortion, otherwise she would
consult that woman in Munich. So he
reluctantly agreed. A sanitary sergeant
of the Army advised him to use hydrocyanic acid, which is one of the most
dangerous poisons; he told him to mix
the poison with another cyanide, black
coffee and lemonade, in this case the
poison would only destroy the fetus,
but would not harm the mother. Goetz
thanked him for his advice and went
to Munich. Here he bought a bottle of
hydrocyanic acid from a druggist; he
told the man that he needed the poison
for some photographical work. He
signed his true name twice in the poison
book of the druggist, although he had
a false identity card with him, which he
was to use for smuggling cigarettes
from France to Germany.
He met his bride in Augsburg; a witness had accompanied her there. He
testified that both were evidently so
much in love with another, that he preferred to leave them alone. Both spent
the evening in a dancing-club in full
harmony. They passed the night together in a hotel, where Goetz again
signed his full name. The girl at once
asked for the "drops" he had promised
her; but he told her to wait until morn-
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ing. Then, when all the people in the
hotel were already awake, he gave her
the bottle with the poison mixed with
black coffee and lemonade. She drank
half of the bottle. She felt unwell at
once. He ran away to call a midwife
because he thought that the fetus was
coming out. When he returned the poor
girl was in agony. He became utterly
upset and frightened and ran away
without looking for heli. She died. Beside the corpse the half-filled bottle
with poison was found. Goetz went to
Stuttgart; here he confessed to a friend
that he had attempted to make an abortion, that his bride had taken "too
much" of the mixture or that the mixture had not been made in the right
way and that the girl was dead. Shortly
afterwards he was arrested.
In the first trial he gave an untrue
statement about the question how he
had got the "fatal prescription." Later
he explained that he had tried to conceal the name of his comrade in order
not to involve him. But suspicion arose,
when his lie became evident. The main
evidence of the prosecution was an expert witness, an old pharmacist. This
expert stated that the use of such a
dangerous poison clearly gave evidence
of the fact that Goetz had planned wilful murder, not abortion. The Court
submitted to the authority of the expert
witness without checking his statement.
The counsel hod no knowledge of judicial medicine as well. Thus nobody was
aware of the fact that the statement of
the pseudo-expert was complete nonsense.
The difficulty was to find a reasonable motive. The district-attorney had
an ingenious idea: On the arrested man
the watch of his bride had been found.
Thus he had murdered his bride in
order to get her watch.
In the new trial where the author
was defending, it could be proved easily
that all kinds of poison are used by
ignorant people for abortion. It was
necessary to call an expert of criminology to the witness-stand, Professor Hans
v. Hentig, coeditor of AschaffenburgHentig's Review for Criminology, now
professor at the University of Colorado.

He made an interesting statement about
the questions involved; he pointed out
that if Goetz had planned wilful murder instead of abortion, he undoubtedly
would have committed the crime in the
evening and not in the morning, thus
being able to leave Germany during the
night, before the murder was detected;
and he surely would not have left the
poison bottle at the bedside of his
victim.
The Court acquitted Goetz of wilful
murder, stating that no evidence, not
even a reasonable suspicion, remained
any longer.
IV
Analysis of the Goetz Case
The Goetz-case, published here for
the first time, is instructive material for
the pathology of criminal justice. First
we see that a lie of the defendant is
being overvaluated, a very interesting
problem the writer has dealt with already in 1929 (20); Goetz first had
stated that he had got the final prescription from a certain friend, which proved
untrue; then he declared that he had
got it from an unknown person in
Francfort, which was untrue as well.
Only in the new trial he gave the exact
name and address of the sanitary sergeant; the latter naturally denied that
he had given this advice. The prosecution in the first trial could easily
prove that Goetz was lying; and so the
fateful prejudice arose that a lying defendant must be guilty. The masters
of criminology, Hans Gross and Enrico
Altavilla, have warned in vain (30) that
the lie of the defendant is no proof
against him at all. It was to be understood that Goetz attempted to protect
his friend. The second reason for ths
wrongful conviction in this case was
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the ignorance and false authority of the
expert witness; the old pharmacist
thought himself to be an expert for
abortion cases, although he had no
knowledge at all about them. In the
new trial true experts were able to
prove exactly, that the use of poison
does by no means exclude the intention of abortion or give evidence for
wilful murder-on the contrary-all
the heavy poisons are used by ignorant
people for abortion. The Court, the
prosecution and the defense had been
just as ignorant as the expert witness,
although they could easily have
checked on the statements of the expert by studying any manual of legal
medicine (31); especially all cyanites
are often used for abortion. Here we
may clearly recognize what tragic results can be caused by ignorance and
laziness in criminal justice. Finally, the
case gives evidence of the fact that
once the wrong way is chosen, it is
continued with an incredible blindness;
there was no reasonable motive at all
why this man should murder his girl.
He was in love with her, he was to
marry her within a few weeks. She
was expectant. She, not he, insisted on
abortion. But even if he himself
wished to get rid of the child, he could
do so by making an abortion, not by
murdering his bride. The prosecution
stated that he had stolen the watch of
the girl. In the new trial the defense
was able to prove by producing a letter,
that his watch was in repair and that she
therefore had lent him her watch. But if
this evidence would hot have been
given, it still seems complete nonsense
that a man, who is to marry a girl,

should murder her to get her watch,
when he may get her and all her property within a few weeks. The Court
was so stubborn and so blind that it.
overlooked the undoubtable fact that
Goetz had registered with his full
name at the druggist's where he got the
poison and at the hotel, where the
tragic event occurred, although he was
in possession of a false identification
card. A little common sense, a little
exactness in investigating the clear
facts and this wrongful conviction
could have been avoided easily.
V
The Pfeuffer-Case
The worker Johann Pfeuffer, a married man with six children, had fallen
in love with a girl. The girl was expectant. The girl was found dead on
June 9, 1923, in a forest near the city
where both were living. The postmortem examination gave evidence of
two facts: in the uterus a small ovum
was found, so that pregnancy was proved.
In the bottom of the gullet a set of
twelve false teeth was found. The
medical expert stated that the death
was caused by suffocation, because the
set of false teeth had closed the trachea. A dentist was called as expert
witness. He stated that it is impossible
to accidentally swallow such a big set
of false teeth and that the set must
have been driven- by using violence,
into the throat.
Pfeuffer submitted to justice himself. He stated that the girl had given
him a rendezvous in the forest and
that she had attempted abortion there
by poring water into the uterus with
a rubber tube. She told him that she
felt unwell and shortly afterwards she
collapsed and gave no answer when he
addressed her. He thought she was joking, left her and went home. The following morning he noticed that he had
forgotten his coat in the wood. He re-
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turned, saw the girl lying on the
ground as before and finally made the
dreadful discovery that she was dead.
He told the event to his wife and his
aunt and confessed that he had attempted the fateful abortion himself.
Both advised him to deny this fact because he thus would be made responsible for her death. So he told the
Court that she had made the attempt
herself.
In the first trial the medical expert
and the dentist insisted on their statements. The prosecution made up a
whole story of invention: she had been
reluctant when he had tried to make
the abortion, he had gagged her with
his handkerchief and thus he had driven
down into her throat the set of false
teeth. The prosecution demanded a
death-sentence. But the Court, unconsciously feeling the weakness of evidence, sentenced him to a fifteen year
term for second degree murder. The
most aggravating circumstance was
that a married man, father of six children, had had sex relations with a girl.
It was very difficult to obtain a new
trial. The prisoner asked me for help.
I began to analyse the story of gagging
her with a handkerchief. His haidkerchief had been examined by chemical
methods to find germs from the cavity
of the mouth of the victim. The result
was negative. This does not prove anything, explained the district attorney,
the defendant probably washed the
handkerchief after the gagging. But
this seemed unlikely, as the defendant
would have had ample time to throw
the handkerchief away, had he felt
guilty. But if the story of the district
attorney was true, did that mean murder? A man who gags a woman and
thus drives the false teeth into her
throat, commits homicide caused by
negligence, not murder. And the whole
story seemed most unlikely. Undoubtedly the woman had planned an abortion, as she brought with her the water
container and the rubber tubing. When
the girl was willing, why must he gag
her? Reading the files, I made a second
discovery: the statement of the postmortem
examination
acknowledged

three corresponding facts: three small
blood-stains were found at the entrance of the uterus; traces of blood
were discovered on the entrance to the
vagina and on the petticoat, jammed between the legs of the corpse. The truth
was evident: during the attempted abortion there occurred a violation of the
uterus. This often brings about an
embolia; if air penetrates into the veins
it causes sudden death by suffocation.
In the new trial the medical expert
insisted on his wrong statement that
the death was caused by suffobation
through the false teeth, but two expert
witnesses of the defense smashed this
statement completely and gave evidence
that the death of the girl was caused
by inexperienced abortion practice and
not by suffocation, on account of gagging her. Now the Court agreed with
the defense in all points. It admitted
that this set of false teeth possibly had
been removed after the death into the
throat, while the corpse was conveyed
from the forest to the city on a van.
The wrongful conviction was annulled
and the defendant was set free at once.

VI
Analysis of the Pfeuffer-Case
The analysis of this third case can
be very short because it corresponds
with the analysis of the Goetz-case in
many points. We have the lie of the
defendant used as proof of his guilt,
we have the ignorant, stubborn expert
witness and we have the lack of reasonable motives. In the new trial two
dentists insisted again that it was
impossible to swallow such a big set
of teeth. I asked these two experts
how many cases of swallowed sets they
had seen in their practice. The effect
was strilking: none. This answer had
to be expected, because cases of this
kind are extremely rare. Now I asked
them

where their knowledge

came
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from. They answered that they were
quoting from scientific works. It now
was easy to prove that the standardwork of legal medicine by HoffmannHaberda and other books (32) show
many cases where big sets of false
teeth had been swallowed and that the
possibility is emphasized there that
such sets may be displaced after the
death if the body has been shaken. So
we see the same lack of control in this
case: a glance into the scientific works
would have proved the ignorance of
the experts, but neither the defense
nor the Court felt it their duty to do
so in the first trial.
VII.
Conclusions
The following main causes of wrongful conviction may be deducted from
these three cases: the blindness of the
prosecution which stubbornly insists
on one possibility, thereby overlooking
all other possibilities; this blindness
appears in the Rettenbeck-case in its
extreme forms, but it reigns over criminal justice in many cases every day.
It is significant that the most absurd
statements were made in order to uphold an incorrect thesis: in the Goetzcase the prosecution made the ridiculous contention that Goetz had killed
his bride to steal her watch, although
he could marry her within a few weeks
and thus get all her property. Of
course, such a nonsensical assertion in
a murder case is an exception; but the
blunder in its finer forms is the more
dangerous. Criminal justice must return to the wisdom of our great master
Hans Gross: to enlist all possibilities

in every single case and to follow every
way as long as one of the possibilities
may not be eliminated with certainty.
The method of elimination the writer
is fighting for, corresponds exactly with
Wigmore's suggestion to design all the
possibilities in every case and to subdivide the drawing then into the single
assertions, objections, proofs and counter-proofs involved. If we apply this
method on the Rettenbeck-case we see
at once how easily the fateful blunder
could have been avoided. The second
cause is the false confidence in the
witness and the expert witness; if the
Court had made scientific investigations of its own in the Goetz-case instead of trusting the authority of the
ignorant "expert" the fateful blunder
could have been avoided. Criminal
justice must finally accept the findings
of criminology that testimony is the
most fallible evidence and that modern
methods of precision (see the measures for identification given by Professor Kuehl in the Rettenbeck-case)
are by far more exact and more reliable. It is the merit of American criminology to plead for the use of the
camera, the chemistry, the fingerprinting method, etc., in order to control the statement of the witnesses. In
this short outline all this can only be
pointed out without going into details.
One conclusion may be deducted
from these three cases: in all of them
the error could have been avoided
easily by using the methods of modern
criminology. This is true for most of
the cases of wrongful conviction. A
little more consciousness and knowledge of criminology, a little less blind-
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ness and indolence, introduced into
criminal justice and the number of
wrongful convictions would be reduced
greatly. The -main task will be today
to do away with the prejudice that
probability and not certainty is needed
for the conviction. We must return to
the wisdom of our master Hans Gross:
the greater the responsibility of a decision, the more exactness and certainty is required. The decision which
involves death or life of our brother
is the greatest responsibility a man has
to bear.
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